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SOCIAL REVOLUTION I N SAUDI ARABIA
PART I

THE HONORABLE HERMANN FR. ElLTS
FORMER AMBASSADOR TO SAUDI ARABIA, 1965-1970

(Editor's Note: Beginning with this issue,
Parameters is publishing a comprehensive
two-part survey o f the background and
current conditions contributing to the social
change taking place in Saudi Arabia. Part I,
below, is concerned primarily with Saudi
traditional values and the economic and
political orientation o f the country. The
article is based on a talk initially delivered by
the author at the University of Pittsburgh
Graduate School o f Public Health.)

At first blush the term "social revolution,"
however lilting in a world of generally
galloping change, hardly seems descriptive of
the situation in Saudi Arabia. We tend to
think of Saudi society as traditional,
immutable, bred of the unblemished virtues
of the desert, introspective and deeply
spiritual in its impulses. Such would indeed
befit the holy land of Islam, the site of Mecca,
whither Muslims the world over aspire to
m a k e t h e i r a t least once-in-a-lifetime
obligatory pilgrimage and towards which they
Ambassador Eilts, Diplomatic Adviser to the Army
War College Commandant, earned his BA (History and
Political Science) at Ursinus College and his MA
(International Relations and Middle East Studies) at
Johns Hopkins University in the School of Advanced
International Studies. He has received the Arthur F.
Fiemming Award for Distinguished Government
Service and is a graduate of the National War College.
In World War II he served in
North Africa and Europe as an
Army intelligence officer.
Foreign Service assignments
with the Department of State
have taken him to Iran, Aden,
Yemen, Iraq, Great Britain,
Libya, and twice to Saudi
Arabia. In 1970, he came to
Carlisle Barracks from Saudi
Arabia where hc had served as
US Ambassador since 1965.
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King Faysal of Saudi Arabia.

turn five times daily in prayerful obeisance.
An avowedly conservative monarchy; under
the rule of an essentially patriarchal,
authoritarian, withal benevolent monarch,
King Faysal ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Saud;
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The old Medina Gate at Jidda. The wall and gate were razed in 1947 and the city has
since expanded northward (toward the photo's background).

transformation of Saudi Arabia from a desert
kingdom into a twentieth century state,
telescoped as it has been in the short span of a
generation, has had its full measure of drama.
An economic revolution of
enormous
dimension has inevitably spawned aspiration
for social change. Like its neighbors in the
Middle East, Arab and non-Arab, Saudi
Arabia is not immune to the processes of
social transformation, of modernization, of
having to adjust its norms and values to the
demands of our times.
It is today a traditional society, deeply
religious in character, in a state of transition,
opting for an evolutionary pace, but perhaps,
as many believe, on the threshold of a more

acknowledging solely the shari'a, the sacred
writ of Islam, as the guarantor of the rights
and duties of its citizens; proscribing political
p a r t i e s , l a b o r u n i o n s , elections and
p a r l i a m e n t s ; prohibiting all alcoholic
libations-country and concept seem utterly
disparate.
Yet, any society, whatever the prescribed
constraints under which it operates, strains,
consciously or unconsciously, to circumvent
imposed restriction and to broaden the
parameters of the permissible. Saudi society is
no exception.
For yet another reason, the term-if viewed
in muted perspective-has more applicability
than appears superficially warranted. The
5

The phenomenal rise in national wealth was
bound to be heady. It prompted for a time a
spree of excessive spending. During the reign
of the late King Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz
(1953-1964), a staggering internal
and
external debt was incurred.
An austerity program, initiated by the
present monarch when prime minister in
1959-60, enabled the debt t o b e paid off. The
subsequent creation of a Saudi Arabian
Monetary Agency (SAMA), designed to
control Saudi currency, has given the country
rare monetary soundness. In an era in which
many Middle East currencies fluctuate widely,
reflecting the strength or lack thereof of the
national economic structure, the Saudi riyal,
backed fully by specie and foreign exchange,
is one of the hardest in the world. Reserves
have been built up and an effort made to
m a i n t a i n balanced budgets, sometimes
admittedly requiring dipping into such
reserves.
Banking, largely limited to money lending
and arbitrage a generation ago, has grown in
scope. Usury is still prohibited, but various
fiscal devices such as commissions, discount
loans, etc., permit mercantile banking to
prosper. The widespread conviction held 20
years ago by Saudis and foreigners alike that
only silver and gold currencies would be
a c c e p t able, however cumbersome their
carriage might be, has been proven false.
Paper currency, introduced in the late 50s,
was in fact accepted with scarcely a ripple.
Insurance, although still legally inadmissible
within Saudi Arabia, is increaingly used to
protect mercantile transactions.
From the onset of an assured petroleum
income, moreover, a program of economic
development was undertaken, partly in the
form of national infrastructure projects,
designed to strengthen the state and advance
the welfare of the Saudi peoples. Sparked
largely by government spending, both the
public and private sectors of the national
economy benefited. The multiplier effect of
massive capital investment and reinvestment
has s u f f u s e d t h e overall economy.
E n t r e p r e n e u r s , large and small, have
proliferated throughout the country and seek
to sell their services or wares.
Unfortunately, in the past eight years Saudi

rapid and significant restructuring of its values
and purposes.The winds of change d o n o t yet
gust in Saudi Arabia, but waft they do.
T h r o u g h a happy combination of strong
leadership and the basically good sense of its
people, the country has to date been spared
the often times destructive convulsions that
have attended the trauma of modernization
among some of its immediate neighbors. One
hopes that this will continue. Unquestionably,
however, Saudi leadership will in the years
ahead increasingly have to reckon with the
challenge of pacing its social and political
reform to be commensurate with the
enormous economic strides that the country
is likely t o continue to make.
The observer who saw Saudi Arabia a
generation ago and again in more recent years
is struck by quantitative and qualitative
comparisons that memory and vision conjure.
Saudi prosperity drifts on a sea of oil. A
few basic statistics illustrate the point.
Twenty years ago petroleum production in
quantity had just begun. In 1948 it had
reached what was then a phenomenal output
of 200,000 barrels per day. Today it has
soared to over 3,500,000 barrels per day.
Petroleum reserves in Saudi Arabia are
conservatively estimated at 8 6 billion
barrels,l with new reservoirs being found. It
has been estimated that in the years
immediately prior t o World War II, the total
income of the Saudi Arabian Government
amounted to a meager $24 million, derived
mainly from customs and pilgrimage receipts.
This small sum barely sufficed to meet the
requirements of government, let alone any
developmental needs of country and people.
The first published budget, for the year
1947-48, estimated revenue as slightly in
excess of $103 million, with income from
petroleum accounting for two-thirds.2 By
1957, a decade later, public revenues
approximated $358 million, now primarily
derived from petroleum revenues.3 The
anticipated income for the current Saudi
fiscal year is estimated at about $1,400
million, more than a thirteen-fold increase in
slightly over 20 years time. In recent years,
Saudi Arabia has been able to boast of an
annual growth rate of between 8 and 10 per
cent, a considerable achievement.
6

Earlier patterns of behavior, dress, and values
persist; many are being visibly assailed and, in
some instances, have been assimilated into
new forms.
The Saudi petroleum industry has done
more than introduce a technology peculiar to
its own requirements. It has encouraged the
introduction of technological advances in
other spheres as well and enabled their
financing. Rapid and mass transportation and
communications are now the order of the
day. An embryonic industrial base, in the
form of refineries, steel and cement plants,
and other factories, has been begun. The
enormity of the task of planning for and
implementing a nationwide development

Arabia has been faced with a disquieting
s e c u r i t y p r o b l e m arising f r o m i t s
confrontation with various radical Arab
states. In consequence, the nation's security
budget has soared to a point where it now
consumes almost 40 per cent of the national
budget to the detriment of at least some
economic growth. In a social sense, however,
even such expenditures have their value.
Apart from strengthening the defenses of the
country, they help to develop the technically
trained human infrastructure needed by the
developing Saudi nation.
Q u a l i t a t i v e l y , t h e contrast is less
susceptible to precise measurement. Here,
too, however, the observer senses change.
7

million people (and even higher estimates
have been voiced), it is frankly doubtful that
there are at present more than four million
native Saudis. This is a narrow manpower base
to support so vast an economic and military
program. Precise statistics are lacking, but it
has been suggested that the annual Saudi birthrate is moving toward a 2.9 per cent figure.4
This will not appreciably affect extant
manpower shortages. The situation has
created a kind of laborers' market, and has
contributed to current inflationary strains. I t
is likely to be a constant determinant in the
rate of national economic and military
progress and to require continued dependence
on expatriate assistance.
To the catalogue of economic challenges
posed for Saudi society must be added the
political turbulence which has plagued the
Middle East as a whole and the Arab world in
particular these past several years. Although

program h a s , understandably, posed
problems. A long dormant Central Planning
Office has recently been revitalized under an
exceptionally able, American trained head,
Shaykh Hisham Nazir. With the help of the
S t a n ford Research Institute, and with
supplementary counsel from a group of
distinguished Harvard and M.I.T. economists,
a Five Year Development Program is currently
being drafted. If it is ultimately accepted for
implementation, it will be the first of its kind
in Saudi Arabia and should prove beneficial in
determining national priorities and allocating
national resources.
As an inevitable concomitant of economic
growth, distribution inequities have arisen
which have created a growing disparity
between rich and poor. In this connection,
Saudi Arabia's population base remains
uncertain. Notwithstanding official Saudi
statistics claiming a population of at least 6.4
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An old water well near Jubayla in eastern Saudi Arabia.
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not a direct participant in the Arab-Israel war
of June 1967, the conflict and its aftermath
have deposited their full measure of
emotional fallout on Saudis as on others.
Following the burning of the al-Aqsa mosque
in August 1969, a greatly aroused Saudi
monarch called for a jihad, or holy war, to
wrest the Old City of Jerusalem from its
occupiers. The humiliation of the Arab defeat
rankles. The country is currently subsidizing
both the UAR and Jordan for losses sustained
in the June 1967 conflict with Israel.
Each of the foregoing factors, economic
and political, affects Saudi thinking. Each, in
its own way, challenges the traditional order
of things and stimulates a yearning for
change.
Generally, in Saudi Arabia as elsewhere, the
cleavage in social outlook is most noticeable
between young and old; between those
nourished in the indelible memory of an
essentially impoverished society having to
scrape for its wherewithal and those born to
relative affluence who take the latter for
g r a n t e d ; b e t w e e n those educated in
traditional Islamic institutions and those
exposed to foreign education, either abroad
or at the hands of the large number of
nonSaudi teachers engaged to staff the
nation's rapidly expanded school system;
between those who want as little as possible
to do with government and those who, by
virtue of education, believe they have a talent
to participate constructively in its processes
and would like a greater opportunity to d o so.
The proponents of more rapid change are
mainly the young men of the country. Many
look to some of the younger members of the
Saudi Cabinet, both princely and commoner,
to pursue the cause of greater liberalization.
Arrayed against the modernizing influences
are various internal forces which seek to reject
or, where this proves impossible, to limit or
control public acceptance of the new.
Traditional Saudi society is built on the twin
edifices of Allah and family. One provides the
rudder, the other, the stabilizer of the social
body. The regime of Islam, as interpreted by
the fundamentalist, Unitarian school of
dogma--Hanbalite in origin, but dubbed by its
detractors as Wahhabite, after its founder, and
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King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud, father o f the present king,
with President Franklin D. Roosevelt aboard the
USS Quincy on the Great Bitter Lake after the
1945 Yalta Conference.

generally known by the latter designation-is
pervasive and supreme. Revivalist rather than
reformist in its thrust, it deplores what it
regards as the ungodliness of modern society
and demands a return to the pristine purity of
early Islam in order to insure man's salvation.
The nation's religious leaders, the ulema
(sing.-alim), as guardians of the traditional
practices of Islam, from which they insist all
enduring patterns of proper conduct must
flow, look askance at all but the simplest
semblances of modernity. They receive full
hearing. In a tradition inherited from the late
King Abd al-Aziz their principals are received
every Thursday in royal audience, where they
may vent their concerns about the insidious
influences, real or imagined, which they
believe threaten to pervert the community of
true believers. Nor is this their sole asset.
Through the instrument known as Khutba,
the regular Friday sermon, which is still well
attended throughout the country, they rail
against foreign influences. Through the
mutawai'in, the religious police, they seek to
enforce strict conformity of religious behavior
and, regrettably, sometimes alienate even
devout Muslims in the process.
9

is he, and he alone, who is the ultimate arbiter
o f a c c e p t a b l e social change. A n
extraordinarily wise and responsible man,
whose experience spectrum spans almost 50
years of active public life; bred of the country
and intimately knowledgeable of its social
complexities; a consummate political leader
and statesman, yet cautious in accepting
innovation, the King has sought to steer a
middle course. His critics grumble that the
promised t e n - p o i n t reform program,
enunciated by the ruler in 1962 when still
prime minister, has been only partially
fulfilled. They are concerned that he may be
excessively influenced by the unreconstructed
views of the ulema. His defenders respond
that the criticism is unjustified. It overlooks,

It is tempting to criticize the ulema as out
of touch with modern realities. Occasional
utterances of various of their number are so
archaic as to make even distinguished alims
cringe. These religious savants should not,
however, be dismissed because of the
shortsightedness of some of their number.
Many are engaging men, highly learned in the
Islamic arts, eminent jurists, and possessed of
a deep sense of humanity. In the final
analysis, their influence is likely to erode, but
for the present they undoubtedly decelerate
the pace of social reform.
Between the traditionalists and
the
modernists, appealed to by both, stands the
ruler, King Faysal. Given the high degree of
centralization which exists in Saudi Arabia it
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In Jidda, the author (center) presents King Faysal with a gift from President Nixon to the people of
Saudi Arabia-the Saudi flag taken to the moon on Apollo XI, and some particles from the moon.
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they insist, the King's deep preoccupation
since 1962 with international problems arising
from the Yemen Civil War and, subsequently,
the Arab-Israel conflict.
Whatever judgment one may reach on this
matter, no ruler in a land where the shari'a
reigns supreme can ignore the counsel of the
religious doctors. Doing so risks domestic
political instability. Instead, therefore, like his
father before him, King Faysal has sought,
slowly and patiently, to bring them around to
an understanding of the need for specific
innovation. This requires give on his part as
well as take. Periodically, for example, royal
rescripts appear enjoining Saudis to cease
" aping" the ways of foreigners and
demanding of all residents of the kingdom
that they respect Saudi traditions in dress and
manner. The very need for such royal edicts,
of course, reflects the unceasing pressure of
social change. There is no denying, however,
that King Faysal, with advancing age-he is
now 65-likes the known and familiar around
him.
Next to religion, the family-in its
extended form-looms largest in Saudi social
dynamics. Primary loyalty is to the family, its
status and its welfare. The head of the family,
to whom all pay deference, is its eldest
male member. When, for example, the King's
septuagenarian uncle enters the room, the
monarch will at once arise and give him pride
of place. The management of the extended
and often fractious family of A1 Saud
(estimated by one of its members as perhaps
5,000 strong), consumes much of the King's
time and places a great extra-governmental
strain on him. In the political sphere, the
succession to the throne, as prescribed by
Saudi custom, goes to the next oldest male
in the family rather than to any direct heirs
who may survive the monarch. This is
customarily sanctioned by fatwa, or religious
advisory opinion. Should the designee decline,
the option proceeds down the line of
seniority. First claim to marriage continues to
be within the family, i.e., the cousin. Any
general deviation from family prescripts is
disapproved not only by the aggrieved family itself, but by society as a whole.
It is clear from the above that the pace of

social reform in Saudi Arabia is conditioned
in large measure by the weight of tradition.
This situation has been accentuated in recent
years by a growing political concern about
hostile leftist encirclement. The UAR, Syria,
Iraq, the People's Democratic Republic of
Yemen, and the Sudan are regarded by Saudi
leadership as largely socialist in political
o r i e n t a t i o n . Somewhat indiscriminately,
Saudi leadership tends to associate any such
orientation with Communist control and
direction. In this situation, and with no end
to the unsettling Arab-Israeli conflict in sight,
Saudi leaders have come to view their land as
the last bastion of religious and economic
freedom. A kind of "Festung Saudiya"
outlook has developed which, regrettably, has
strengthened the rejective tendencies of those
elements who view innovation with distrust.
These retarding factors notwithstanding,
Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of King
Faysal, has moved on the road of social
reform. Selective, guided change has been and
continues to be the keynote of Saudi
leadership.

The advent of the petroleum industry,
i n c l u d i n g petroleum related activities,
launched Saudi Arabia on the process of
social change. It exposed a heretofore languid
Saudi society to a massive and powerful
dosage of modern technology. It brought a
wave of bustling Americans and other
foreigners with strange ways and emphasizing
productivity. It introduced modern housing,
air conditioning, and a host of imperfectly
understood but patently beneficial employee
practices. It infused money into the local
economy. In relatively short order, it
transformed the barren landscapes of
Dhahran, Abqayq, Ras Tanura, and other
parts of the Eastern Province into busy oil
centers. Above all, it offered Saudis regular
work where there had previously been none,
regular wages, medical and other benefits.
Where skills were lacking, as was often the
case, it offered the training required to attain
them. In the early fifties, with the
construction of TAPLINE (Trans-Arabian
11
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The Tuwayq Escarpment on the road from Riyadh to Jidda.

ARAMCO

Nearly half o f TAPLINE was constructed above ground to avoid expensive rock excavation costs.
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Crude oil for loading aboard tankers is stored at a tank farm at Ras Tanura.

Pipe Line), the more sparsely populated
Northern Province was similarly advantaged.
Although delayed in its expansion by
World War II uncertainties, the Arabian
American Oil Company (ARAMCO) had by
the end of 1948 brought in almost 4,200
American employees, along with various other
nationalities, to inaugurate the industry. Still
more important, over 12,200 Saudi Arabs had
been engaged and were in training or
employed as carpenters, mechanics, drivers,
welders, etc. As a corollary, ARAMCO
encouraged the development of indigenous
Saudi contractors, who might increasingly
handle the many ancillary services required by
an oil industry, but not an integral part of it.5
Socially conscious from the outset, and
deeply concerned with developing close
relationships with its Saudi hosts, ARAMCO

placed great emphasis on understanding the
customs, mores, and aspirations of the
country where it worked. It established a
well-trained and effective Government
Relations Division specifically charged with
m a i n t a i n i n g c o n t a c t with the Saudi
authorities and sensing the pulse of public
thinking. It adopted a long range policy of
having Saudis take over, wherever possible,
functions commensurate with their skills and
experience. Its ultimate objective has been
and remains to reduce expatriate staff. In
1948-49, ARAMCO reached its peak of
American employment. Since that time it has
steadily replaced Americans with Saudi
nationals. In 1969, only about 800 American
employees remained as compared with 8,500
Saudis then oil the payroll.6
The experiment was infectious; its ideas
13

American personnel, the overall Saudi
exposure to American and European firms,
and to their expatriate employees, has
increased.
There are at present over 7,500 Americans
working in the country, as widely dispersed as
Jidda, Riyadh, Kharj, Tayf, Tabuk, Khamis
Mushayt, and the Eastern and Northern
Provinces. Among American firms, Trans
World Airlines holds a contract to manage
Saudi Arabian Airlines; in the wake of a sale
of HAWK missiles, Raytheon is engaged by
the Saudi Ministry of Defense in training
Saudi military personnel in the operation and
m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h e s e missiles;
Commonwealth operates the impressive
Dhahran International Airport;
Commonwealth-Tumpane has a contract to
improve the Saudi military transport system;
and various smaller American firms are
similarly engaged. A British consortium, after
selling Lightning aircraft, is training Saudis in
the use and maintenance of these multi-role
fighters. It is also constructing various radar
communications connected with air defense.
Italian firms are building roads. A Dutch firm
is building a major desalting plant in Jidda,
using the "universal design" developed by the
Office of Saline Waters of the United States

and philosophy took hold; they were further
refined through experience and rapidly spread
throughout the country. As oil income flowed
in increasing measure into the country's
coffers, the Saudi Arabian Government was
enabled to begin a program of development.
A crescendo of construction activity marked
the fifties and sixties. Although performed at
the time largely by foreign firms, it was
increasingly assisted by a steadily growing
number of Saudi subcontractors. On the heels
of American firms came British, German,
Italian, Swedish, Finnish, Japanese, and
others. In the commercial sphere, Saudis vied
with each other in seeking to obtain foreign
agency associations. The Saudi market
continues to be highly attractive to foreign
entrepreneurs in association with Saudi
businessmen.
By the mid-fifties, another operational
pattern had been set. A training program,
designed to permit Saudis ultimately to take
over operation and maintenance functions,
had become an essential component of
virtually every project contract. The degree of
success varied from project to project, but
had the overall effect of elevating and
broadening Saudi technical competence.
Despite ARAMCO's continuing drawdown of
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The HAWK missile is included in the arms inventory of the Saudi Army.
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Department of Interior. An American
firm--AquaChem--has a contract for a similar
plant at Khobar. The number of Europeans of
various nationalities now working in Saudi
Arabia probably exceeds 8,000. These
expatriates have daily contact with Saudi
counterparts and much, if not all, of their
expertise steadily rubs off.
I n addition, substantial numbers of
Palestinians, Lebanese, Jordanians, Sudanese,
and some Syrians and Egyptians have been
engaged over the years to assist in various
facets of the developmental process. The
largest foreign Arab element is Yemeni and
Hadhrami, perhaps a half-million in number.
Arabs from the northern states tend to be
engaged in white-collar jobs; those from the
South and the Sudan are usually in more
menial employment. All bring their own
ideas, methods, and problems which they seek
to introduce into the Saudi crucible. Despite
Linguistic and religious affinity, such
non-Saudi Arabs often tend to be regarded as
outsiders and are distrusted.
Saudi armed forces-largely Army, but
including smaller Air Force and Navy
components--have been established. The
Saudi Army is equipped with modern
weaponry, including the already mentioned
HAWK missile. The Royal Saudi Air Force
flies Lightning, F-86, and C-130 aircraft. Its
personnel are learning to operate and
maintain such sophisticated equipment. A
Saudi Navy is in the making. Taken as a
whole, the Saudi military elite cuts a
respectable figure. It was greatly heartened,
incidentally, by its success at Wadi'a in
February of 1970 against invading South
Yemeni forces.
Industrialization and project development
have brought with them governmental
supervision. A spate of ordinances has
appeared over the years regulating contractor
activities, labor relations, social services, and
the like, particularly in areas where the shari'a
was recognized to leave interstices. Although
sometimes rather casually administered, the
thrust of these ordinances was generally
sound. In priority of law, they rank below the
shari'a. Yet, in the absence of canonical
guidance, there is a growing willingness on the

part of magistrates (qadhis) to cite them in
court judgments. More recently, in 1969,
largely at the strong personal insistence of
King Faysal, new labor and social insurance
laws were promulgated. They represent the
most comprehensive Saudi effort to date to
improve working conditions and employee
benefits for the country's growing work
force.7 Although still in need of clarification
in some areas, they open a new chapter in
Saudi labor practices. A new Civil Service law
is currently also under study and is expected
to be issued in due course. These ordinances
reflect the determination of the Saudi
authorities to improve the welfare of
important population sectors. The trend may
be expected to continue.
Industrialization has also brought with it a
growing urbanization. Jidda, Riyadh, and the
greater Dammam complex were small towns
twenty years ago. They have developed into
sizable cities, the first two now claiming over
3 0 0 , 0 0 0 i n h a b i t a n t s each, as urban
employment prospects have lured villagers
previously engaged in subsistence economics.
Inevitably, in this type of situation, some
slum conditions have developed and remain a
part of the urban scene. Other erstwhile
villages, such as Burayda, Anayza, Hofuf, and
Hail, have grown into towns. Throughout the
Kingdom, hamlets have graduated into
villages. Sunbaked mud brick remains the
primary building material in rural areas, but
housing in towns and cities is usually of
c e m e n t block, often neo-Egyptian in
architectural style and frequently brightly
painted. Cement consumption, a good
indicator of construction activity, has almost
doubled in the past five years. It stood at
790,000 tons in 1967-68, with local
production meeting about 4 0 per cent of the
total. 8 The Saudi Arabian Government and
ARAMCO have offered their employees low
cost, low interest housing as a means of
improving living standards. More low income
housing remains in demand.
Many of the old cities and towns are today
virtually new in form. Old buildings have been
razed in order to make room for new ones.
Few buildings in Tayf, Khobar, Dammam, or
Riyadh are today more than twenty years old.
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foreigners working in the Kingdom and partly
due t o developing local tastes, new marketing
techniques have been introduced in many
sectors. Saudi Arabia must still import most
of its food and household requirements, but
t h e shops of Jidda, Riyadh, Khobar,
Dammam, and elsewhere are becoming
increasingly well stocked. Modern shop
windows, often neon-lighted, display lingerie,
women's clothing, appliances, furniture, and a
wide assortment of luxury products. In the
past two years, food supermarkets have made
their appearance. Even the traditional bazaars
(suq) are modernizing in stock and facades.
Fixed pricing is coming in, but bargaining
remains a n appreciated and mutually
exhilarating test of wits. The accelerated pace
of Saudi business notwithstanding, the
time-honored offer of the thimble-size cup of
cardamom-flavored coffee still marks its
etiquette.
Transportation has improved enormously.
In 1950 there were only two stretches of
paved road in the Kingdom, one between
Jidda and Mecca, the other between Dhahran
and Abqayq. The roads covered a total of
about 150 kilometers. In the intervening years
a national road construction program has
proceeded apace, and in 1966 the first
trans-Peninsular highway connection was
completed. The national road grid has
increased to over 11,000 kilometers and more
road construction is underway. Some Saudi
roads, for example the steep escarpment
portion of that connecting Mecca and Tayf,
are conspicuous for their fine engineering. An
increasing number of lorries and cars ply these
roads and provide rapid trucking service to
the interior. The Mercedes five-ton truck
virtually dominates the highways. Saudi
Arabian Airlines, which boasts the largest
commercial air fleet in the Middle East,
ranging from DC-3s to Boeing 707s, connects
all major points in the country and offers
direct flights to Europe, other parts of the
Middle East and Pakistan. Saudi and
American crews share the cockpits and have
established a good record of reliability.
T h e Saudi Arabian Railroad, which
connects Dammam with Riyadh and points in
between, while hardly economic, still runs but
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Modern apartment and office buildings in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia's capital.
In the process, regrettably, some of the finest
specimens of the graceful Saudi architecture
and latticework of the past have been
destroyed. The tendency is to be ashamed of
the old, however picturesque, and to try to
conceal its remnants. Progress is conceived in
terms of new, often purely functional
structures.
Throughout the Kingdom electrification
has made headway. As the large urban centers
become increasingly hard pressed to meet
growing power demands, the high cost of
electricity evokes much public grumbling.
Through a variety of means, plans are afoot to
increase power supplies. In various villages
rural electrification cooperatives have been set
up. Their sometimes helter-skelter wiring
systems, c o n n e c t e d to small central
generators, seem to work and have added a
new dimension to village life. In Jidda,
Riyadh, and elsewhere modern sewage
systems are being established, and water is
being piped into homes. To mention yet
another area of urban improvement, no longer
need the frantic Saudi telephone caller shout
vainly, " Markaz! Markaz!" ("Central!
Central!") into an unheeding instrument;
automatic dial systems now serve the major
cities.
Partly in response to the large number of
16
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The highway between Mecca and Tayf curves 174 times in 54 miles.

its roadbed is in need of repair. For many
years now work has been underway, in
conjunction with the governments of Jordan
and Syria, to restore the Hejaz railway, a line
of dubious economic value but of great
religious importance. No longer is it an
expedition to visit one Saudi city from
another. Commuting between Jidda and
Riyadh for a day of business has become
standard
fare for Saudi merchants and
officials. Many Saudi employees of ARAMCO
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commute each weekend from their places of
work to Hofuf, where their fanlilies reside.
This newfound ease of travel has markedly
increased social mobility. In turn, this should
have a coalescing effect. Provincialism in
Saudi Arabia, although it should not be
overrated, has been an obstacle to national
cohesion. Hejazis, commercially oriented and
relatively cosmopolitan as long
hosts of
the annual Muslim pilgrimage, tend to regard
Najdis as unsophisticated; Najdis, traditionally

more puritanical and xenophobic, view
Hejazis as effete and grasping; Hasawis tend to
be Gulf-oriented and sometimes allege official
neglect. A governmental effort some years ago
to try to overcome such sectionalism through
nomenclatural fiat, i.e., by redesignating the
provinces as Western, Central, and Eastern,
has only partially altered provincial attitudes.
Increased exposure of geographically minded
Saudis to each other should help to
strengthen national identification.
Agricultural development is high on the
national priority roster. Under the direction
of a capable Minister of Agriculture and
utilizing F A O (Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations) and
private contractor help, a program is
underway to probe available water resources
as a prerequisite to expansion of cultivable
areas.
The annual pilgrimage, to which the Saudi
authorities attach high importance for its
spiritual significance and as a means of
projecting the nation's image abroad, receives
much attention. The management of over a
million a n n u a l visitors of divergent
nationalities, languages and ages, increasingly
concentrated in recent years into a four to six
week period, poses major logistic, health, and
security problems. These have been handled
with commendable foresight and have elicited
favorable comment from many such pilgrims.
The task is likely to become still more
formidable if, as is expected, the annual
inflow of foreign pilgrims continues to
increase.
Much attention has been given to the
establishment of hospitals, health centers, and
dispensaries throughout the country. The
number of health centers increased during the
decade 1957-67 from 38 to 271; of
dispensaries from 45 to 180; and of hospitals
from 29 to 49. More of each have been
sanctioned.9 Some Saudi doctors have already
been trained and are on duty. Other aspiring
medical practitioners are currently in training.
For the moment, however, there is a

considerable reliance upon Pakistani doctors
and nurses. At least 1,000 such doctors and
nurses have been engaged by the Saudi
Arabian Government to staff these health
centers, especially those in the outlying areas.
In yet another sphere, although distinctly
subordinate to the King, cabinet government
has expanded in scope and responsibility.
Commoners share with royal princes the
management of government departments. A
large (some believe swollen) bureaucracy has
been built up. The Ford Foundation has for
some years, by Saudi Arabian Government
invitation, been studying the organization of
various ministries with a view to making
recommendations t o sharpen their
effectiveness.
(Part II will follow in the fall issue o f
Parameters.)
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